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James Joyce, through his alter-ego Stephen Dedalus, spoke of
the "ineluctable modality of the visible." Joyce was the undisputed
master of the literary allusion. He fed on both the classical and the
pedestrian; he twisted, allegorized, sub-referenced and transformed
the written word, leaving generations of awed readers to trace, fol-
low, and finally dance along his literary footprints.
Post-modern artists, like Joyce in literature almost a century
before, speak in a symbolic language of quotations and allusions.
The grammar of this language is Appropriationism - the incorpora-
tion of recognizable visual images into new works of art. The style
and philosophy of post-Modernism is heavily dependent upon the
practice of Appropriationism, which gives contemporary art its
unique and irreverent flair.
To the law, appropriation is simple copyright infringement, for
which only minor exceptions are allowed through the doctrine of
fair use. Appropriationists have tried to avoid liability by invoking
the defense of fair use, to little avail. The philosophical underpin-
nings of post-Modernism and intellectual property are fundamen-
tally at odds. Artists and legal scholars therefore share a concern
that the doctrines of copyright are acting to silence artistic expres-
sion. How do we weigh the interests of the quoted against those of
the quoter?
1. JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 37 (1st American ed. 1934).
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This Article sets forth the legal calculus of fair use, and how
the fair use doctrine has been applied to fine arts. It next sketches
the context for the trends in contemporary fine art that have
stretched the doctrine to its limits. It then explores whether Ap-
propriationism warrants a re-formulation of the fair use analysis,
and concludes that it is not the calculus of liability, but the availa-
bility of remedy that must be re-examined.
I. THE LAW
A. Policy Considerations of Fair Use
Article I of the Constitution states: "The Congress shall have
the Power . . . To promote-the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."2 This
"Promotion" is the constitutional mandate behind all of copyright
law - the fostering of creative expression and dissemination of
ideas.
In order to promote creative expression, the law must balance
two competing goals.3 The first goal is to encourage the creation of
new expression that is entirely original. To provide incentives for
such creation, the law must provide a remedy for the free goods
problem inherent in the market for all intellectual property.' In
the absence of copyright protection, any person could reap the
benefits of an author's efforts by copying and selling his work.
Copyright law corrects the potential for abuse by granting the au-
thor a legal monopoly on the work's exploitation.5 The rents from
this monopoly are aimed at "encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain."6 In the world of fine arts, the protection of copy-
right is the only means an artist has for reaping the economic
fruits of his creation.
The second goal of the law is to avoid stifling the creation of
new expression that is based on existing works.7 The grant of copy-
right limits such creation by exposing the authors of derivative
2. U.S. CoNs., art. I, § 8.
3. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43
U. MIAMI L. REV. 233, 246-47 (1988).
4. Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1611 (1982).
5. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
6. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
7. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
[Vol. 10:195
2
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol10/iss1/9
FAIR USE AND FINE ARTS
works to legal liability." However, copyright law makes allowances
for the derivative work process through the fair use doctrine.9 Fair
use promotes this second goal by granting authors the right to
make limited use of copyrighted works. This mechanism serves to
"subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum finan-
cial return to the greater public interest in the development of art,
science and industry."10 In the world of fine arts, the doctrine acts
to protect creative expression that uses an underlying work as a
springboard to greater and further expression. Authors who use an-
other work "add something to the material by placing it in an ana-
lytical or critical context, thereby making it their property ...."I'
When courts rule on whether a use is infringement or fair use,
they must determine which goal is more important. Such a deter-
mination will depend on conceptions toward the creative process.
If one believes that creation is better described as an act under-
taken in a vacuum, then it is more important to protect author's
rights.1" This has been called the "romantic" or Wordsworthian
conception of the author,"3 akin to "creating Aphrodite from the
foam of the sea."14 This conception leads to a narrow definition of
fair use.
However, if one believes that creation is best described as a
synthesis of existing expression, then it is more important to allow
artists to use previous works as building blocks for new work. Most
legal commentators argue that such a conception is more realistic.
Jessica Litman writes:
Composers recombine sounds they have heard before; play-
wrights base their characters on bits and pieces drawn from real
human beings and other playwrights' characters; novelists draw
their plots from lives and other plots within their experience;
software writers use the logic they find in other software; law-
yers transform old arguments to fit new facts; cinematographers,
8. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1126
(1990).
9. See generally, Litman.
10. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1954).
11. Laurie Stearns, Copy wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property and the Law, 80 CAL.
L. REV. 513, 529 (1992). Some commentators suggest that this should be one of the factors
in determining fair use. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV.
1105, 1111 (1990).
12. Litman at 965.
13. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 'Author-
ship', 1991 DUKE L. J. 455, 459 n. 11; see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EM-
ORY L. J. 965, 1008 (1990).
14. Jaszi at 460 n.14.
1993]
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actors, choreographers, architects, and sculptors all engage in
the process of adapting, transforming, and recombining what is
already "out there" in some other form. This is not parasitism:
it is the essence of authorship.'
This could be termed the "Nothing New Under the Sun" con-
ception of authorship. Artists and critics share this view. Roberta
Smith, art critic for the New York Times, expressed it in her com-
mentary on the work of Marcel Duchamp. "[W]orks such as his
'Ready made' bottle rack or 'L.H.O.O.Q.,' his mustachioed Mona
Lisa, . . . in their original state questioned the whole notion of
originality and autonomous artistic creativity."' 6 This conception
leads to a broad definition of fair use, one that would allow an au-
thor liberal access to existing works.
1. First Amendment Issues
Protection of authors' rights also creates a tension with the
guarantee of freedom of speech. Insofar as copyright protection
limits the author's ability to promulgate works that are substan-
tially similar to existing works, it limits his ability to express
himself.
In this country, freedom of speech has been largely conceived
in political terms. Primarily, this is due to our "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open[.]" 7 This preference for po-
litical speech is based on a paradigm of the "Marketplace of
Ideas," in which all political speech, true or false, perceptive or ill-
conceived, vies to sway the opinion of the voting public.18 In the
American view, it is dangerous to our political process to restrict
the dissemination of ideas,'9 because our government is kept in
15. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990). This view
is shared by Professors Merryman and Elsen. "The creative act is not an act of creation in
the sense of the Old Testament. It does not create something out of nothing; it uncovers,
selects, re-shuffles, combines, synthesizes already existing facts, ideas, faculties, skills. "
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 376 (2d ed.
1987) (quoting ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION).
16. Roberta Smith, The Whitney Interprets Museums' Dreams, N.Y. Times, July 23,
1989, § 2, at 31.
17. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
18. This idea is set forth by Justice Holmes' famous quotation; "[Tihe best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes sagely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. Manifested, for example, in the Court's disfavor of prior restraints. See LAURENCE
[Vol. 10:195
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check by the freedom of the "Market".20
Melville Nimmer posits that appropriation of visual images is
justifiably restricted, since art lacks political significance in com-
parison to written materials." Because of the open-ended charac-
ter of the fair use inquiry, the Supreme Court's application of the
doctrine can hinge on this distinction. In Hustler Magazine v.
Jerry Falwell, Justice Rehnquist held that the copying of an ad
parody was fair use, but emphasized that "graphic depictions and
satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and polit-
ical debate."
2
Some commentators believe that freedom of expression is fun-
damentally at odds with copyright protection.2'3 This position is
difficult to defend in light of the artist's obvious dependence on
copyright for his livelihood. It may be true that removal of copy-
right protection would increase an author's ability to express him-
self, however, an artist cannot take advantage of artistic freedom if
he cannot make a living exploiting his art.
Given the constitutional mandate of protecting the dissemina-
tion of ideas, copyright protection does not significantly threaten
freedom of speech. By definition, copyright protection only limits
the copying of expression that has already been made public else-
where." In this respect, it does not restrict content.2 5 However, an
overly narrow definition of fair use threatens content, because it
prevents criticism and commentary on what has gone before.
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §12-34 (1988).
20. See generally, Alexander Meiklejohn, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948).
21. Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565,
1577 (1984) (citing Melville B. Nimmer, Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA
L. REV. 1180, 1197 (1970)).
22. 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988).
23. Krieg at 1578.
24. The Copyright Act of 1976 pre-empted the common law doctrine that usually ex-
empted unpublished works from fair use. Lisa Vaughn Merrill, Should Copyright Law
Make Unpublished Works Unfair Game?, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1399, 1406-07 (1990). However, a
fair use defense against the infringement of unpublished works is difficult to win because it
encroaches upon the right to first distribute a work. See Harper & Row v. Nation Enter-
prises, 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985).
25. "Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed
by the author's work. . .[A]nyone is free to create his own expression of the same concepts,
or to make practical use of them, as long as he does not copy the author's form of expres-
sion." REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (Comm. Print 1961).
19931
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2. The Ineluctable Modality of the Visual
Issues of free speech and fair use in fine arts are inextricably
bound to the theoretical difference between expression and
thought in the law of intellectual property. Copyright does not pro-
tect the underlying idea.2"
This issue is difficult to apply to fine arts. In an icon, the idea
and the expression are one. Nimmer argues that the idea/expres-
sion dichotomy is inapplicable to the visual arts.27 "No amount of
works describing the 'idea' of the massacre could substitute for the
public insight gained through the photographs. 28 The difference
between the spatial or plastic arts (visual) and the temporal arts
(music and poetry) has been approached by a number of disci-
plines for different reasons. It is behind the musings of Joyce
about the ineluctable modality of the visual.29 Joyce's famous ref-
erence is derived from Aristotle's argument that the eye passively
perceives an image, but the ear participates in what it hears.3 0 Aes-
thetician Gotthold Lessing discussed the unique qualities of the
visual in his 1766 work Laocoon.3 1 Arthur Koestler, in his The Act
of Creation, calls visual thinking more primitive and of greater
emotive potential than auditory or semantic thinking.3 2 Once tech-
nology of the twentieth century advanced to the point where visual
images could be easily reproduced and promulgated, various theo-
reticians took up this call. Vachel Lindsay examined the power of
the visual in his "tableau logic" theory of film, 33 and Marshall
McLuhan built a career discussing mass media and its effect on
culture in the 1960's.
3 4
Such discussions may seem to tread too far along the meta-
physical path for most legal analysis, however, they are essential to
26. See Krofft v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
27. Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for Copyrights, in JOHN LAW-
RENCE AND BERNARD TIMBERG, FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 314 (2d ed. 1989). Elizabeth
Wang persuasively argues that in abstract art, the idea/expression dichotomy is perfectly
meaningless. Elizabeth Wang, (Re)Productive Rights: Copyright and the Postmodern Art-
ist, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 261, 274 (1990).
28. 2 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §9.232, at 28.22 (1973).
29. See DON GIFFORD, NOTES FOR JOYCE: AN ANNOTATION OF JAMES JOYCE'S ULYSSES 32
(1974).
30. Id.
31. Laocoon, in Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for Copyrights, in
LAWRENCE & TIMBERG, supra note 22, at 311.
32. ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION 321 (6th ed. 1964).
33. VACHEL LINDSAY, THE ART OF THE MOVING PICTURE (1915).




University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol10/iss1/9
FAIR USE AND FINE ARTS
the application of copyright law to visual art forms. As Justice
Story wrote in his famous opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, intellectual
property issues come "nearer than any other class of cases . . . to
what may be called the metaphysics of the law ....
B. Defining Fair Use
The Fair use doctrine has been called "the most troublesome
in the whole law of copyright."3 This troublesome nature is the
result of the doctrine's fragmented development and its haphazard
application to most modern means of expression.
1. Copyright
Copyright law was originally formulated to protect literary ex-
pression. Black's Law Dictionary defines "Copyright" as "The
right of literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive
law . . . ."' Much of the activity in United States copyright law
over the past century has tracked the attempt to adapt the tradi-
tional literary protection to new forms of expression; in the past
half century, technological advancements have come faster and in
greater leaps, and stretched copyright law far beyond its original
foCUS. 38
Some of the statutory rights now collectively called "copy-
right" existed at common law, and some of these rights continued
to be applied until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act.39 The
first statute in the modern era was the Copyright Revision Law of
1909, which was passed in response to the newly emerging record
and phonograph industry.4" The 1909 Act remained in effect until
1976, when Congress undertook a comprehensive revision of Title
17. The 1976 Copyright Act embodied a grand streamlining of stat-
utory copyright law, and was the result of twenty-two years' delib-
eration, testimony of over 300 witnesses, and 51 executive meetings
of the House Judiciary Subcommittee. 1
The duration of copyright protection is currently the life of
35. 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
36. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
37. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 336 (6th ed. 1990).
38. See Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for Copyrights, in Lawrence
& Timberg, supra note 22, at 305.
39. Id. at 306.
40. Id.
41. John Lawrence, Copyright Law, Fair Use, and the Academy: An Introduction, in
Lawrence & Timberg, supra note 22, at 3.
1993]
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the author plus fifty years.2 After that point, the work falls into
public domain. Before the 1976 Act, duration was significantly
shorter - a fourteen year term that was renewable for one addi-
tional fourteen year term.4 3 Thus, after 1976, the flow of copy-
righted material into the public domain was significantly delayed.
Since the original function of the public domain was to provide
new authors access to existing works, authors are more dependent
on fair use now more than ever." Although the 1976 Act's ex-
tended duration is formulated in deference to the needs of the au-
thor, omitting any calculus of public benefit, it is unlikely to
change in light of the recent adherence of the United States to the
Berne Convention, which requires a minimum duration of fifty
years for all member countries.4
Copyright protection was extended to the visual arts relatively
late, because the technology for reproducing visual images was in
its infancy during the passage of the 1909 Act. Photographs were
first held copyrightable in 1884, soon after the invention of modern
photography.4 6 However, it was not until 1954 that Mazer v. Stein
held pictorial, graphic or sculptured works to be appropriate mate-
rial for copyright protection.47
The copyright is not one right but a "bundle of rights" which
include the right to publish and distribute, the right to publicly
display or perform, and the right to create derivative works. 8 For
the purposes of applying the fair use doctrine, the two important
sticks in this bundle are derivative works and compilations.
Derivative works include "translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization . . abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. '4 9 Compilation is a special kind of derivative work, which
Title 17 defines as a work formed by the collection and assembling
of preexisting materials coordinated, or arranged in such a way
42. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c) (1988). If there is no single identifiable author, the term of
protection is 75 years from the date of the work's publication, or 100 years from the date of
its creation, whichever is the shortest. Id.
43. ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAw 6 (6th ed. 1986).
44. See generally, Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
45. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, art. 7(1).
46. LATMAN, supra note 43 at 68, citing Burrow-Giles Lithogaphic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53 (1884).
47. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
48. Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for Copyrights, in LAWRENCE &
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The copyright for a derivative work extends only to the mate-
rial contributed by the author of such a work, and "does not imply
any exclusive right in the preexisting material. ' 51 Thus, an author
who translates a novel into another language may claim a copy-
right in the translation, but not in the original work. The author
owns only some of the rights to his creation and cannot license or
exploit the translation without the permission of the novel's au-
thor. Moreover, the right to use the original work to create the
translation belongs to the original author.
2. Copyright Infringement
Fair use was originally formulated as an equitable defense to
copyright infringement claims. The prima facie case for copyright
infringement has two elements, access and substantial similarity.52
According to the Ninth Circuit, this can include either extrinsic
similarity - that of general idea or "look and feel" - or intrinsic
similarity - literally identical forms of expression.5 1 Clearly, a sub-
stantial similarity based on "look and feel" would have devastating
implications for artists, who are generally categorized in schools or
movements, but the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the
54issue.
Intent is not extremely relevant to the analysis. Close similar-
ity between the copied work and the copying work is sufficient to
make out a prima facie case for infringement." However, addi-
tional statutory damages for infringement are available if the in-
fringement is "willful."56
50. 17 USC § 101 (1993).
51. Id. at § 103(b).
52. 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01[B], at 13-
10.1 (1992).
53. Id. at § 13.03[A] at 13-34, citing Krofft v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977)
54. Two Circuit cases have used such a formulation of substantial similarity. Roulo v.
Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989) (defendant's greeting cards infringed
plaintiff's generally similar group of cards); Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant's McDonaldland characters infringed
plaintiff's H.R. Pufnstuf characters).
55. See West Pub. Co. v. Lawyer's Co-op. Pub. Co., 79 F. 756, (New York, 1897).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1993).
1993]
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3. Development of the Fair Use Doctrine
The defense of fair use creates "a privilege in others than the
owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reason-
able manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly
granted to the owner by the copyright."57 The first articulation of
the doctrine is usually credited to Justice Story, who set forth the
idea that use was not infringement if it was "justifiable use," which
included "fair abridgment" or "fair and reasonable" criticism.5
Justice Story examined "the nature and object of the selections,
the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects of the original work. '"59
The fair use doctrine's development proceeded in concert and
counterpoint with the development of copyright law. Until 1976,
the judge-created defense was developed and refined, based on fac-
tors drawn from the facts of each case and weighed in equity. 0
The 1976 Copyright Act codified these factors with little altera-
tion. 1 Congress did not intend the codification to change the com-
mon law defense.62 The factors set forth in the statute are not ex-
haustive and courts may continue to apply the equities as they see
fit when resolving fair use questions.6 ' As the legislative history
states, "The courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended to re-
state the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, nar-
row, or enlarge it in any way. "64
However, the 1976 Act recast fair use as a reservation in the
rights granted the author, rather than an equitable defense against
an infringement claim. The Act now states that notwithstanding
57. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966)(quoting H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
58. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 345 (No. 4,091) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
59. Id. at 348.
60. For a detailed history, see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPY-
RIGHT LAW 18-63 (1985).
61. John Lawrence, Copyright Law, Fair Use, and the Academy: An Introduction, in
LAWRENCE & TIMBERG, supra note 27, at 10, 306-09. This avoids the necessity of applying
two different doctrines, since works created before January 1, 1978 are still covered by the
1909 Act. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 175.
62. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Rider Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1980).
63. See Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y.
1982).
64. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 55-56 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong.,
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the grant of copyright in Sections 106 and 106A, "the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (in-
cluding multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright.
'66
In practical terms, this redefinition is not extremely impor-
tant. It may have the effect of shifting the burden of proof for
what is fair use. However, in civil cases, where the standard for
proof is a preponderance of the evidence, the shift of such a bur-
den means little. Moreover, courts are extremely reluctant to re-
solve fair use questions on summary judgment," so the resulting
resolution at trial means that both sides usually introduce evidence
as to fair use. Thus, Congress' intention to leave the doctrine in-
tact despite its codification was well served by this redefinition.
The codification has had little impact and the doctrine remains es-
sentially a weighing of equities.
4. The Four Factors of Fair Use
The Copyright Act specifies the factors to be taken into ac-
count when determining whether a possible infringement is fair
use.
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 8
Each of these factors presents special analytical problems for ap-
plication of the doctrine to fine arts.
a. Nature of Use
The fair use defense is most successfully invoked when the infring-
ing work is created for scientific, educational or charitable pur-
poses. 9 Similarly, this defense is better suited for non-profit activi-
66. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1993),.
67. See DC Comics v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1993).
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ties as opposed to commercial activities.7"
Many artists believe that art should not give way to commer-
cial motives, 1 and consider their work something other than a
commercial use. However, intention is not dispositive.7 2 The Su-
preme Court has held, "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction
is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copy-
righted material without paying the customary price.
73
When the nature of use does not fit neatly into either a com-
mercial or non-commercial category, the court will typically ex-
amine whether the use inures to the public benefit. Judge Leval,
who wrote the opinion in Salinger v. Random House,4 writes
"[T]he inquiry should focus not on the morality of the secondary
user, but on whether her creation claiming the benefits of the doc-
trine is of the type that should receive those benefits. '75 The Sec-
ond Circuit has held, "While commercial motivation and fair use
can exist side by side, the court may consider whether the alleged
infringing use was primarily for public benefit or for private com-
mercial gain.""
Many artists may consider themselves amateurs and thus may
believe that their work will escape the scrutiny aimed at commer-
cial users. However, the lack of professional designation of the art-
ist is not controlling. In Bourne Co. v. Speeks, fair use did not
apply to the performance of entire songs by amateurs in a country
music theater where admission was charged. 7 The court generally
considers fine arts, despite their ability to edify and beautify, to be
almost exclusively commercial uses.
Commercial designation is an important factor in the fair use
analysis,7 s and it is clear that fine arts will generally not escape
such a designation. Commentators have criticized the courts for
classifying fine arts as a commercial use because the distinction be-
70. Id. (citing Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302
(E.D. Pa. 1938)).
71. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 205 n.2. See also Harold Rosenberg, The
Art World: Adding Up, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 20, 1973, at 72-77.
72. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966).
73. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
74. 650 F. Supp 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
75. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1126
(1990).
76. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1989).
77. 670 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn 1987).
78. Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investor's Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984).
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tween commercial and educational purposes is indistinguishable
when applied to the fine arts. 9 Moreover, as art finds its way into
museum collections or is displayed to the public, it does inure to
the public benefit. If one believes, as Professors Merryman and El-
sen do, that art belongs to the world,80 then it is shortsighted to
classify art as a commercial enterprise. Possibly in response, one
California District Court has held that broader scope is given to
fair use in the field of fine arts, than in "commercial enterprises." '
However, this distinction has not been adopted by any other court.
b. Nature of Copyrighted Work.
Analysis of this factor proceeds along two lines. The first is
whether the underlying work has been disseminated to the public.
Courts generally hold that if an underlying work is unpublished,
then the fair use defense is negated.8 2 This is probably not an im-
portant consideration for artists. Art that makes references to
images is pointless unless the underlying image is recognizable.
Unpublished material is not recognizable enough to be an appro-
priate subject.
The second line of analysis categorizes the copyrighted work
much as the first factor categorizes the derivative work. Courts
generally give less latitude to artists than to authors of academic or
news material. The Second Circuit has held that "When informa-
tional works are involved, as opposed to creative ones, the scope of
fair use is greater" 3 and that "even substantial quotations might
qualify as fair use in a review of a published work." '84 In Sony v.
Universal, the Supreme Court held that "The law generally recog-
nizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of
fiction of fantasy. '8 5 Courts generally draw the line between these
categories rigidly, turning a deaf ear to claims that artistic expres-
sion is intended to inform its viewer.8 6
79. Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for Copyrights, in LAWRENCE &
TIMBERG, supra note 27, at 313-14.
80. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 139.
81. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal.
1955)(The Gaslight case).
82. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985).
83. See Wojnarowicz v. American Family Assn., 745 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
84. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
85. 464 U.S. 417, 455, n.40 (1984).
86. Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 144.
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c. Degree of Use
Commentators have criticized the application of this factor to the
visual arts as entirely inappropriate.87 Unlike text or music, which
are essentially sequential in nature and can be easily excerpted,
visual material comes in one, instantaneous image. One Court has
held that every frame of a film is a work of art, thus rendering the
use of any one frame a complete copying.8
If the purpose of using an image is to express some commen-
tary or criticism of the underlying work, abbreviating the image is
useless because it renders the original work unrecognizable. Thus,
if a visual work is copied, it is usually copied to a substantial de-
gree. 9 This is why visual artists so easily run afoul of the fair use
doctrine. Although a fair use defense is rarely available to a user
who copies an entire work,90 the Supreme Court has held that com-
plete copying does not preclude a fair use defense.9 ' Some com-
mentators have therefore suggested that the substantial use crite-
rion should be inapplicable to visual works.92
Although case law applying this factor is scant, the same phe-
nomenon is at work in the analysis of parody, upon which ample
case law exists. Parody has long been held to be fair use.9 3 The
courts have recognized that parodies require enough imitation of
the copied work to spark public recognition." However, the Ninth
Circuit has held that a parodist must copy only as much of the
underlying work as is "necessary to recall or conjure up the
original." 95
This affords the parodist little peace of mind. Copying the
most recognizable parts of a work can be dangerous. In Robertson
v. Batten, the court held that it was unlawful to copy four bars of a
song, when those four bars were the portion of the song on which
87. Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for Copyrights, in LAWRENCE &
TIMBERG, supra note 27, at 313.
88. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F.Supp. 130, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
89. WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 434 (1985).
90. Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565,
1572 (1984).
91. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Jerry Falwell, 606 F. Supp. 1526 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
92. Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for Copyrights, in LAWRENCE &
TIMBERG, supra note 27, at 313.
93. 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[C], at 13-
102.20.
94. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986)(the When Sunny Sniffs Glue
case).
95. Walt Disney v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978).
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its popular appeal depended." Uses that extract "essentially the
heart" of copyrighted material are less likely to be held fair use.9
In effect, however, the degree of copying is a threshold test.9 8
If a work is not substantially copied, an action for copyright in-
fringement will not be present. In some cases, this factor has been
distinguished from the substantial copying issue by taking into ac-
count the percentage of the derivative work that is copied, rather
than the percentage of the underlying work. In Harris v. Miller,
the defendant copied a small part of Oscar Wilde's biography to
write a play.9 The court held that because the copied sections
were nearly verbatim and comprised a significant part of the play
(rather than the biography), the use fell outside the fair use
doctrine.' 0
d. Effect on Potential Market
The Supreme Court has held this factor to be the "single most
important element" of the fair use analysis.' 1 In the 1980's, an ec-
onomic analysis of the fair use doctrine gained popularity, 02 and
such an analysis was adopted by the Supreme Court in Harper &
Row, 103 If a use "dilutes the market for, or decreases the value of,
the copyrighted work, that use is a copyright infringement."'
0 4
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority,' 5 the court held
that the lack of effect on sales of Hustler magazine was an impor-
tant factor in finding that the parody of Jerry Falwell was fair use.
In Maxtone-Graham v. Burchaell,106 the court held that defend-
ant's book, which quoted heavily from plaintiff's book of inter-
views, was fair use because the plaintiff's book was going out of
print for lack of sales.
For artists, this factor can cut either way, depending not on
96. 146 F. Supp. 795 (D. Cal. 1956).
97. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).
98. Nimmer appears to consider the issues of substantial copying and this factor
identical. 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.051A], at 13-
102.3.
99. 50 U.S.P.Q. 306, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
100. Id. at 309.
101. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
102. See generally, Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600
(1982).
103. 471 U.S. at 559. See also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
104. Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565,
1574 (1984).
105. 606 F. Supp. 1526 (S.D. Ca. 1985).
106. 631 F. Supp. 1432 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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the equities of the case but on the vagaries of the art market. Sales
of an underlying work may skyrocket simply because of the public-
ity involved in a lawsuit over appropriation. This could weigh
against a plaintiff and result in a ruling of fair use. Such a phe-
nomenon may have been at work in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Associates,1 0 7 where the court held the publication of frames from
Zapruder's film of the Kennedy assassination to be fair use. The
court found little injury to the plaintiff, saying, "Plaintiff does not
sell the Zapruder pictures as such and no market for the copy-
righted work appears to be affected. Defendants do not publish a
magazine."1081 As at least one commentator has observed, there are
two problems with such an analysis. First, any licensing fees that
would have resulted from the use of the photograph would have
been part of the market for the photographs, and second, the copy-
right holder had the right to make the business decision as to
whether to license the work. 09
In neither of the two cases most directly addressing the appli-
cation of the fair use doctrine in fine art, Koons and Wojnarowicz,
did the court take this into account.110 In Wojnarowicz, the court
stated, "While the current controversy may have sparked interest
in plaintiff's art works, that interest is likely to last only as long as
the controversy and is more likely to attract sensation seekers than
purchasers." ' It is unclear what evidence, if any, the court used in
making such a statement. In the market for post-Modern art,
where sensationalism is rampant, such a spark of interest may
make or break a career.
1 2
In Wojnarowicz, the court appropriately pointed out that
where a work was excerpted for the purpose of criticism, liability
cannot exist for a loss in sales that results from fair criticism.'1 3
Thus, damages due to economic effects must accrue from loss to
the plaintiff due to unfair or misleading use of the work"14 or from
economic benefits to the defendant from his infringement of plain-
107. 293 F.Supp. 130, 146 (2d Cir. 1982).
108. Id.
109. W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 99 (1985).
110. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1992); Wojnarowicz v. American Family
Assn., 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
111. Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 145.
112. Robert Hughes suggests as much regarding the fame of photographer Robert
Mapplethorpe, whose work he believed did not warrant the attention it received. Robert
Hughes, Art, Morals and Politics, N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS, April 23, 1992, at 21.




University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol10/iss1/9
FAIR USE AND FINE ARTS
tiff's work."'
Some commentators have viewed fair use in entirely economic
terms, framing the inquiry in terms of market failure and how to
regulate it. Professor Wendy Gordon has argued that fair use
should be granted whenever three conditions are met: 1) there is
"market failure" (in other words, the user cannot license the use);
2) the use would serve the public interest; and 3) the copyright
owner's economic incentives would not be substantially impaired
by allowing the fair use."' Although the Supreme Court has not
framed the inquiry in exactly these terms, such an analysis identi-
fies the direction of the inquiry well.
e. The Functional Test
Because of seeming anomalies that can arise from reliance on the
market factor, commentators and courts have sometimes resorted
to a more refined analysis of market effect. In the functional test,
"the scope of fair use is .. .constricted where the two works in
issue fulfill the same function in terms of actual or potential con-
sumer demand, and expanded where such functions differ.' 17 As
another commentator puts it, the issue is whether the derivative
work is "capable of being substituted for the original." 8
This factor could easily come into play for visual artists. Art-
ists who use images from everyday objects or commercial adver-
tisements will probably not interfere with the market for such
goods or the ones they advertise. However, this test has not *yet
been adopted by the Supreme Court and cannot be relied upon to
result in a ruling of fair use.
f. Other Factors
Since Title 17 supplies a non-exclusive list of factors," 9 courts may
still apply facts unique to each case to weigh in the outcome of a
fair use determination. Although First Amendment factors may
come into play, the Second Circuit has held that "the fair use doc-
trine encompasses all claims of First Amendment in the copyright
115. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1993).
116. Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analy-
sis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982).
117. 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[C], at 13-
102.20.
118. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., Dissent-
ing)(quoting ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW, (5th ed. 1979)).
119. 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A], at 13-
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field."1 0 This language is inconclusive, since it does not seem to
exclude First Amendment analysis. However, the court appears to
be avoiding a First Amendment analysis that would result in a dif-
ferent calculus from the existing fair use criterion of public bene-
fit.1 21 Courts also seem to frown upon lewd parodies.12 2 In addition,
courts tend to rule against fair use when the copying distorts
the meaning of or unfairly represents the underlying work.
12 3
C. Problems of Uncertainty
Although there are clear statutory guidelines with which to as-
sess claims of fair use, the doctrine is a balancing test, which suf-
fers from the disadvantage of all balancing tests - uncertainty. The
fair use doctrine is "exceptionally elusive even for the law."12 4 It is
difficult to foresee where a court will draw the line between in-
fringement and fair use.
This difficulty is exacerbated by the tendency of courts to re-
quire full trials on the merits of the fair use defense. "Fair use does
not assist parties, or industries, in making ex ante determination
whether or not to copy, and if so, how much. It is a highly fact-
specific defense usually deemed inappropriate for resolution at the
summary judgment stage." '25
The fair use doctrine also shares the principal advantage of
balancing tests - flexibility. The fair use doctrine "permits courts
to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when .. . it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to fos-
120. New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989). See
also Roy Export v. CBS, 672 F.2d. 1095, 1099-1100 (2d Cir. 1982).
121. See generally Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech and the Visual Arts, 93
YALE L.J. 1565, 1574 (1984).
122. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Parody of "Boogie
Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B" entitled "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C" held to
infringe); DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc. 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga.
1984) (Superstud and Wonder Wench characters, parodying Superman and Wonder Wo-
man, held to infringe); Walt Disney Productions v. Nature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Mickey Mouse March" played during sex scene in movie held to infringe);
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (copying Disney car-
toon characters in a comic book where characters are portrayed in a "free thinking, promis-
cuous, drug ingesting counterculture" held to infringe). But see Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way
Productions, Inc. 8 Media L. Rep. 1016 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (picture of "Poppin' Fresh" engaged
in sexual acts with "Poppie Fresh" held as fair use).
123. Wojnarowicz v. American Family Assn., 745 F. Supp. 130, 144-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
124. Marvin Worth Products v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1273
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
125. Jane Ginsberg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works
of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1926 (1990)(citing DC Comics v. Reel Fantasy, Inc.,
696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982)).
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ter."' 26 Congress had this in mind when it codified the doctrine. 12 7
In a 1986 commentary, John Shelton Lawrence points out:
The conception of fair use as a somewhat indeterminate rule of
reason is by no means unique among legal notions. Other areas
of the law employ such expressions as "reasonable, prudent
man" (torts), "due process" (constitutional), "unfair competi-
tion" (antitrust), and "equitable settlement" (divorce
proceedings).12
The problem with this argument is that none of these areas involve
freedom of expression, which is easily chilled without a bright-line
rule. Artists in particular may suffer from this chill, because it
means that in order to avoid liability they must attempt to license
those images they wish to use. 29 Many artists are unsophisticated
as to licensing procedures and copyright law, and may be entirely
unequipped to deal with such a requirement. The art dealer, upon
which many artists rely almost to exclusion for their dealings with
the law and the workaday world, 30 may also be ill equipped to
oversee licensing arrangements. Moreover, it is impossible to force
the holder of a copyright to license the work. As the holder of a
monopoly interest in the property, he may simply refuse to deal.1 3'
II. THE ARTS
A. Modern Art: The Response to Technological Utopia
The iconoclastic mission of modern art - to change perspective
and challenge our ways of seeing - began with Cubism. At the turn
of the century, western culture was ripe for and rife with change.
The progression from Cezanne's moody yet recognizable country-
sides to Marcel Duchamp's practically unrecognizable "Nude De-
scending a Staircase" took place in less than a decade - 1904 to
1912.132 In the early twentieth century, artists began to incorporate
the cultural responses to industrial development into their work.
The icon of the era was the machine, and modernism embodied the
126. Iowa Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1980).
127. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 55-56 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975).
128. John Lawrence, Copyright Law, Fair Use, and the Academy: An Introduction, in
LAWRENCE & TIMBERG, supra note 27, at 11.
129. RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 343 (1988).
130. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 379-80.
131. Elizabeth Wang, (Re)Productive Rights: Copyright and the Postmodern Artist,
14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 261, 280 (1990).
132. ROBERT HUGHES, THE SHOCK OF THE NEW 19, 52-53 (1991).
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belief that technology could transform the world. 133 The modernist
movement remained vital well into the period of World Wars, after
which its early faith in technology began to fade.""
Like modern art itself, Appropriationism is a natural response
to the revolution in technology. The use of existing images in mod-
ern and post-Modern art has moved from the physical incorpora-
tion of other works - collage - to reproduction through the technol-
ogy of mass production - electronic and photographic copying.
Every succeeding technological advance stretches the possibilities
for infringement and the application of fair use.
The first Appropriationist technology was collage, a natural
outgrowth of the fragmented cubist style. The first use of collage
(or "gluing") is usually credited to Pablo Picasso. In his 1912
painting "Still Life with Chair Caning," Picasso incorporated an
oilcloth printed with a caning design found on the cafe tables, in-
jecting an image from the real world into his composition. 135 Pi-
casso continued to make extensive use of this technique in 1912,
foreshadowing much of the style of post-Modern art. His composi-
tions "Glass and Bottle of Suze" and "Table with Bottle, Wine-
glass and Newspaper," include newspaper headlines and news-
print, the mass media of the day. 136 Picasso incorporated artwork
from lingerie advertisements into "Au Bon Marche," transforming
the commercial images of the day into his work much as the Pop
artists were to do half a century later.3 7 Although Picasso did his
early collages half a century before Appropriationism became a
movement, he is regularly cited as its primogenitor.'3 8
Collage was soon embraced by the Dadaists. In 1920, Max
Ernst's Dadaist collage "Murdering Airplane" combined images of
the German bi-plane, female limbs, and sepia-colored soldiers.3 9
"Murdering Airplane" was significant because it used these images
to criticize. The collage "sums up the feeling of being strafed."'4 "
Likewise, in 1920, Hannah Hoch created "Pretty Maiden," a col-
lage replete with twenty-two BMW logos, a pneumatic tire, a wig
133. This was the particular philosophy of the futurists. Id. at 43.
134. Id. at 57-111.
135. Id. at 32.
136. David Cottington, What the Papers Say: Politics and Ideology in Picasso's Col-
lages of 1912, ART J., Winter 1988, at 354-55.
137. Edward F. Fry, Picasso, Cubism and Reflexivity, ART J., Winter 1988, at 302.
138. Telephone interview with John Caldwell, Curator of Painting and Sculpture, San
Francisco Museum of Modern Art, Dec. 12, 1992.
139. Hughes, supra note 132, at 72.
140. Id. at 71.
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and a light bulb.1 4' Her repetition of a commercial image is a strik-
ing premonition of the devices of the 1960's Pop art movement.' 
2
Contemporary art critics regularly draw the connection between
today's post-Modernists and the Cubist and Dadaist movements of
the early 1900's. Roberta Smith, critic for the New York Times,
connects the work of Hannah Hoch with contemporary sloganeer
Barbara Kruger.'43
Collage is still a healthy practice. In the mid-1980's, artist
Alexis Smith created a series of "Janes," thirty collages of icono-
graphic images from commercial and advertising materials, each
with the word "Jane" inscribed at the bottom.'44 Below that, each
collage had a different subtitle: "Calamity" Jane, Jane Eyre, Dick
and Jane, Jane Russell.'45 One such collage includes a picture of
Frances Farmer, who played Calamity Jane in the 1941 film "Bad-
lands of Dakota," and bears the following quotation from the real
gunslinger: "I just wish they would leave me alone, and let me go
to hell by my own route.'
46
As technology advanced, photography eclipsed collage as the
preferred Appropriationist technique. Photography bridged the
gap between fine art and science by taking the execution of the
artwork entirely out of the hands of the artist and putting it into
the black box of a machine. Because photographs are capable of
mass distribution and reproduction, they were hailed as a technical
revolution that would restore the egalitarianism of art. Aleksandr
Rodchenko, a graphic designer who, between 1917 and 1920, cre-
ated constructivist posters in the newly minted Soviet state, be-
lieved that photography was the medium of instant socialism.'
4 7
The advance of photography has redefined traditional notions
of authenticity. Art critic Robert Hughes comments, "How many
people by now can say that their experience of the Mona Lisa as a
painting is more vivid than their memory of it as a postcard?" ' '4
As artist Sherrie Levine explains in a 1985 interview, "By the time
a picture becomes a bookplate it's already been re-photographed
141. Id. at 72.
142. Id. at 249.
143. Roberta Smith, Photomontages of the 20's Still Resonate in the 90's, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1992, at C22.
144. Hunter Drohojowska, Alexis Smith, ARTFORUM, Oct. 1987, at 87.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Hughes, supra note 132, at 95. Rodchenko wrote, "Art has no place in modern life
.Every cultured modern man must wage war against art, as against opium. Photograph
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several times."' 4 One recent legal commentator calls the concept
of an "original photograph" absurd, and suggests that given the
technology of photo-reproduction, the high value of original art-
work is a mere product of consumerist culture. 150
The Pop art movement of the 1960's is generally deemed to
have been a reaction to the rise of media culture, and nowhere is
this more evident than the black and white works of Roy Lichten-
stein and Andy Warhol, all done in the years between 1960 and
1962.1'' At the current MOCA exhibit in Los Angeles, these works
are exhibited together to emphasize that they were a reaction to
the pervasive images of black and white photography.'52
B. The Philosophy of Post-modernism
1. What is post-Modernism?
Intelligible statements of post-Modernist doctrine or philosophy
are rare. Post-Modernists are able to describe modernism, and
agree that post-Modernism is something subsequent to and differ-
ent from modernism, but rarely progress further to a concrete defi-
nition.'53 In the post-Modern era, "[t]he central purpose of art and
art criticism . . . has been dismantling the monolithic myth of
modernism and the dissolution of its oppressive progression of
great ideas and great masters."' 54
Peter Schjeldahl, a poet and art critic for the New York Times
and Village Voice, comments, "'Post Modern' makes so many as-
sumptions about what 'Modern' means. Mainly it seems to me to
translate into, we don't have to know what we're talking about be-
cause it's over. Which is a very Modern tenet. It seems like every-
thing about all of the functions of the term 'post-Modern' in terms
of thinking are very Modern, very Modernist. It's just the same old
thing."' 55 Many critics of post-Modernism similarly feel that it is
149. Siegel, After Sherrie Levine, ARTS, June 1985, at 141.
150. Elizabeth Wang, (Re)Productive Rights: Copyright and the Postmodern Artist,
14 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 261, 267 (1990).
151. Christopher Knight, When Pop First Popped: 'Hand-Painted Pop: American Art
in Transition, 1955-62' at MOCA Documents the Triumph of the Genre and Redefines its
Place in Postwar Art., L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, Calendar at 3, 88.
152. Id.
153. For example, "Modernism marginalized the issue of artistic motivations or inter-
ests outside the art system, denying that artworks were themselves bound by a web of con-
nections to specific historical and artistic contexts." Brian Wallis, What's Wrong with this
Picture? An Introduction, in ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION Xiii
(Wallis ed. 1984).
154. Id.
155. Ingrid Sischy, We are Talking With. ARTFORUM, Feb., 1988, at 45.
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nothing more than "the culture of responses to modernization" '
and in that sense is not so much post-modern as anti-modern.
2. Pop and the Visualization of Culture
Pop art was the beginning of Appropriationism in the post-
Modern era. Pop was art's response to "the overpowering presence
of media," '157 appropriating the images of advertising and consumer
products into artwork. Marshall McLuhan, the leading philosopher
of Pop era, theorized that the pervasiveness of mass media would
work fundamental changes in American culture.' 58 There is no
question that this has come to pass in the sense that the media has
changed both our culture and the art that reflects it. As McLuhan
said, "Information pours upon us, instantaneously and
continuously. '"1 59
Much of this information now comes in the form of visual
images, and art has responded to the deluge. The catalog for the
1989 Whitney Museum exhibit "Image World: Art and Media Cul-
ture" explains:
Today across America 260,000 billboards line the roads ...
23,076 newspapers and magazines are on sale, 162 million TV
sets will be turned on for an average of 7 hours, 23,237 movie
theaters will project films, and 27,000 stores will rent videotapes.
By the time the day ends, you will have been exposed to 1,600
commercial messages. Tomorrow there will be more. Welcome to
Image World, America's postwar visual environment. 60
Even Robert Hughes, one of the more outspoken critics of post-
Modern art, shares this view. "Nature has been replaced by the
culture of congestion: of cities and mass media. We are crammed
like battery hens with stimuli, and what seems significant is not
the quality of meaning of the messages, but their excess. Overload
has changed our art."6 ' ArtForum, the voice of the avant-garde art
community, agrees. "All post-Modern culture is in some sense a
response to the triumph of television. The schizoid demands that
156. Id.
157. Paul Richard, Welcome to the 'Image World'; At the Whitney, a Sleek, Chic and
Shallow Response to the Media Blitz, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1989, at G1, quoting the catalog
of the 1989 Whitney Museum exhibit, Image World: Art and Media Culture.
158. MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7-21
(1965).
159. MARSHALL McLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE 63 (1967).
160. Paul Richard, Welcome to the 'Image World'; At the Whitney, a Sleek, Chic and
Shallow Response to the Media Blitz, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1989, at G1.
161. Hughes, supra note 127, at 324.
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the mass media make leave an artist torn between mockery and
envy, and much of the work that ensues tries fretfully to engage
the esthetic of banality without embodying it."' 16 2 In other words,
the media is the message of post-Modern art.
3. Self-Referent Art
At least one of the messages of post-Modernism appears to be
that the mechanics of the art market should be one of the principal
subjects of art.163 It is this self-referential tendency that, some crit-
ics contend, has turned contemporary art into a series of abstruse
messages that are inaccessible to everyone but the denizens of the
art world itself. Adam Gopnik, art critic for the New Yorker, com-
ments that "the popular audience for modern art is disappearing,
and has been displaced by a professional constituency. '"1 6 Gopnik
claims that in Appropriationism the point is "to create a kind of
in-group art, which looked like the art the audience admired but
could be understood in a mode of vengeful irony."165 John Baldes-
sari, a post-Modernist photographer and teacher, in "Source," a
1987 mixed-media photo-collage, depicts three persons, holding
two canvases as if to display them, with round dots obscuring their
faces. 6 ' A 1988 Baldessari portrays a group of people watching a
painter at his easel, with their faces obscured by dots.1 67 The mes-
sage is clear: it is not the artist, or even the art consumer who is
important, but the process itself.
The Whitney's 1989 exhibit "Image World" included a piece
with the following verbal messages: "institutional taste analysis,"
"museum fatigue" and "institutional unconscious."1 68 The exhibit
also included a piece which critic Roberta Smith described as "ve-
hemently self-aware and self-sufficient," an Ashley Bickerton
sculpture which included a digital readout of its rising market
value, verified by the museum.'1 9 One of the most prominent art-
ists to use this self-referential approach is Hans Haacke, whose
162. Richard Goldsten, The Ethics of Banality, ARTFORUM, Jan., 1988, at 77.
163. Adam Gopnik, The Death of an Audience, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 1992, at
143.
164. Id. at 141.
165. Id. at 143.
166. John Miller, John Baldessari, ARTFORUM, Mar. 1988, at 135.
167. Advertisement for the 3rd International Contemporary Art Fair, ARTFORUM, Oct.
1988, at 167.
168. Roberta Smith, The Whitney Interprets Museum's Dreams, N. Y. TIMES, July
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work "Spurt's 'Les Poseuses' (Small Version)" traces the owner-
ship of a Paul Seurat painting from collector to collector, including
biographical sketches of the owners, and the prices and details of
the exchanges. 7 '
This tendency toward self-reference has made the "quotation"
an essential element of post-Modern art. "[Tihe basis of Post-
modernism is the idea of the quote, the pastiche and the reference
.... ,? 171 Last summer, an entire exhibition entitled "Quotations:
The Second History of Art" at the Aldrich Museum was devoted to
the practice of "art quoting" or appropriation.
72
4. De-emphasizing Artistic Merit
Another tenet of post-Modernism is its notion that quality
and originality are "sinister devices of cultural control. 1 73 Artists,
faced with the boon of the technology of mass production, are now
able to create images with little or no technical training. The first
to publicly capitalize on that idea was Andy Warhol, who set up
his "Factory," a studio in which hired artisans mass produced his
ideas.1
7 4
This phenomenon; too, is a subject - all grist for the post-
Modernist's mill. Mark Tansey's work "Triumph Over Mastery
II", depicts a man effacing Michelangelo's "Last Judgment" with a
paint roller. 75 If the media is the message, then quality is no
longer the issue. The focus of art is condensed to a short attention
span - like a sixty-second television spot or a billboard disappear-
ing down the side of the road. There is no imperative to stop and
admire or examine post-Modern art; it is meant for immediate
consumption.
5. Critique of Private Property
Some artists and critics view the very act of appropriation as a
challenge to conventional notions of property. Legal commentators
are quick to point out appropriation's relationship to property law.
170. Id.
171. Adrian Dannat, The 'Mine' Field, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 23, 1992, at 20.
172. William Zimmer, Appropriation: When Borrowing From Earlier Artists is Irre-
sistible, N. Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, sec. 13CN at 22.
173. Paul Richard, Welcome to the 'Image World'; At the Whitney, a Sleek, Chic and
Shallow Response to the Media Blitz, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1989, at G1.
174. David Lister, Post-War Image of Fun and Rebellion, THE INDEPENDENT, May 9,
1991, at 5.
175. Andy Grundberg, Attacking Not Only Masters but Mastery, N .Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 1990, at C29.
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"[T]he act of appropriation itself imparts a political message. It
reveals that society (and its legal system) is laden with assump-
tions that financial incentives promote individual creativity, and
that property interests supersede society's right of access to ideas
and information. '17 This view is widely repeated.1 7 7 While em-
braced by critical legal theorists, it is not a new idea. Pierre Prou-
dhon set forth a socialist critique of copyright as early as 1966.171
Of course, this issue goes far beyond the fair use doctrine. If
we are to question the basic tenets of property law, a reformulation
of the fair use doctrine will not do much to change it. Moreover,
expanding the fair use doctrine to accommodate this idea would
rob the commentary of its bite. If wholesale appropriation were
sanctioned by the law, the act of appropriation would no longer
have any meaning as a criticism of property law.
III. CLASH OF LAW AND ART: POST-MODERNISM AND FAIR USE
For the purpose of this inquiry, artists who run afoul of the fair
use doctrine fall into three categories. Most common are the Ap-
propriationists, who incorporate images from commercial art or
fine art into new works of art, and claim authorship for themselves.
Next are Simulationists, who set out to duplicate either the style
or the exact work of a well-known artist or school of artists. Last
are Conceptualists, who take ordinary images, re-contextualize
them, and claim authorship of the concept of positioning them in a
new way. The application of fair use to each of these schools of art
presents different policy issues.
It is useful to note that these categories roughly coincide with
the definitions of derivative works in Title 17. Those artists who
transform images in some way, rather than merely duplicating or
re-contextualizing them, are creating derivative works. Those who
simulate existing works are by definition merely copying, or creat-
ing a reproduction of the same work. Those who re-contextualize
images may be creating compilations by placing things into new
juxtapositions.
176. Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565,
1578 (1984).
177. "Appropriating ineluctably involves politics." William Zimmer, Appropriation:
When Borrowing From Earlier Artists is Irresistible, N. Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, sec. 13CN
at 22; "When Sherrie Levine raises serious issues about ownership when she photographs
Walker Evans' works and claims them as her own." Carl Jerome, Non-Traditional Photog-
raphy, U.P.I., May 12, 1989, BC Cycle, at 1.
178. PIERRE JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY?: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE
OF RIGHT AND OF GOVERNMENT 393-98 (1966).
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A. Appropriationists
1. Appropriation of Commercial Images
The patron saint of appropriation is Andy Warhol. Warhol
was the figurehead of the pop art movement in the 1960's, which
liberally appropriated images from a variety of sources. Warhol's
trademark style reproduced commercial images that had become
cultural icons. The 1962 work "200 Campbell's Soup Cans" depicts
two hundred cans in ten rows of twenty, in a random pattern of
about a dozen different flavors. 7' In addition, Warhol used images
from film and photography. ' His serial photographs of Marilyn
Monroe and news stills are now cultural icons in their own right.
The heir to Warhol's artistic vision is widely considered to be
Richard Prince. Prince is most famous for his appropriation of the
men from Marlboro cigarette ads. 8 He has been called the inven-
tor of Appropriationism,'8 but such a statement would ignore
Warhol's contribution to the practice. Used with and without ad-
vertising copy, the subjects of Prince's work are "instantly recog-
nizable" as Marlboro men and emphasize the depth to which ad-
vertising images are buried in our cultural unconscious.' In 1983,
Prince ran afoul of the law by appropriating a photograph of
Brooke Shields, which he entitled "Spiritual America No. 1" and
exhibited in a fake art gallery he had set up.' s4 The picture's origi-
nal photographer, Gary Gross, attempted to serve Prince with a
lawsuit but was thwarted by the disappearance of the fake
gallery.'8 5
Claes Oldenberg, another famous Appropriationist, may be
credited with creating some of the most hated public art in the
United States. His trademark style, consisting of monumental
sculptures of utilitarian items such as lipstick'8 " and clothespins 87 ,
179. Hughes, supra note 132, at 349.
180. See Donald Kuspit, The Modern Fetish, ARTFORUM, Oct. 1988, at 140.
181. Robert Hughes, Mucking with Media; The Whitney Offers a Long Trek through
the Alien Goo, TIME, Dec. 25, 1989, at 93.
182. Paul Taylor, Richard Prince, Art's Bad Boy, Becomes (Partly) Respectable, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1992, Arts & Leisure sec. at 31.
183. Kenneth Baker, Borrowed Images of Richard Prince, S.F. CHRON., June 30, 1992,
at E3.
184. William Zimmer, Appropriation: When Borrowing From Earlier Artists is Irre-
sistible, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, sec. 13CN at 22.
185. Paul Taylor, Richard Prince, Art's Bad Boy, Becomes (Partly) Respectable, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1992, Arts & Leisure sec. at 31.
186. Oldenberg's lipstick, now in the courtyard of Morse College at Yale University,
has been moved at least once due to student complaints. Students routinely sneer at it, or at
least did so in 1976-1979, when I lived there.
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is a classic example of appropriation of a commercial image. 01-
denberg, whether consciously or not, has avoided legal liability by
appropriating functional items, which are not granted copyright
protection."18
A very recent example of appropriation suggests that the prac-
tice is alive and well. Maguire Thomas Partners, a real estate de-
veloper whose managing partner is current president of the Los
Angeles County Museum Board of trustees, commissioned artist
Dennis Oppenheim, for $30,000, to create a sculpture for a Santa
Monica business development." 9 The sculpture was entitled "Vi-
rus," and resembled "a jungle gym with 34 fiberglass figures of
Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck skewered on a matrix of bronze
rods."'190 Oppenheim cast the figures from plastic toys made 60
years ago in Japan. 19' He molded them into Fiberglas in "dull
shades of green, orange and yellow.'
'1 92
The Walt Disney Company discovered the artwork less than a
year after it was completed, filed suit and demanded the sculp-
ture's removal, alleging copyright infringement. 19 Disney offered
to settle the matter with a $15,000 retroactive license, but Oppen-
heimer refused.' The artist claimed that, due to fabrication diffi-
culties, he made no profit on the sculpture and could not afford the
license. 95 He offered to cut up the figures to make them less recog-
nizable, but Disney in turn demanded removal of the sculpture.196
Oppenheim made this comment about the lawsuit: "You go to a
flea market, you buy a bunch of figures, two of them turn out to be
Mickey mouse and Donald Duck, and you put them in a sculpture
or a collage. Artists do this all the time. That's appropriation."' 97
Artists who, like Oppenheim, re-cast cartoon characters risk
exposure not only to copyright infringement but to unfair competi-
tion as well. 198
187. Hughes, supra note 132, at 361.
188. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
189. Suzanne Muchnic, Disney Orders Removal of Sculpture, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16,
1992, at B1, B8.
190. Id. at B1.
191. Id. at B8.
192. Id.
193. Id. at B1.
194. Id. at B8.
195. Id. at B1.
196. Id.
197. Id. at B8.
198. ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAw 47-49 (6th ed. 1986). See DC Comics, Inc. v.
Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F.Supp. 110 (N.D.Ga. 1984).
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2. Appropriation of Images from Fine Art
By far the most famous example of appropriation is embodied in
the case Rogers v. Koons.199 Jeff Koons, the most notorious artist
of the 1980's and 1990's, appropriated a photograph by Arthur
Rogers, a commercial photographer, to create a sculpture for his
"Banality" show. 20 0 Rogers had been commissioned by an acquain-
tance, Jim Scanlon, to make a photographic portrait of his dogs.2 0
Rogers photographed Scanlon and his wife holding eight German
Shepherd puppies between them in a row.2 12 The photograph was
exhibited in the San Francisco Museum of Contemporary Art and
sold under license as a commercial postcard.0 3
Rogers was one of the rare cases of copyright infringement in
which there was direct evidence of copying.20 4 "Banality," con-
sisted of twenty sculptures to be fabricated by an Italian studio.20
Koons neither draws nor paints, and does not keep. a studio.2 0"6
Koons bought a copy of the postcard, tore the copyright notice off,
and sent it to Italy to be copied.2 7 He visited the studio and di-
rected the artisans to use the same angles, poses, and expressions
"as per photo. '20 8 He altered the work in minimal ways, placing
daisies in the couple's hair and adding vivid colors.20 9 The sculp-
ture was made in an edition of four, three of which Koons intended
for exhibition and sale and one of which he reserved for himself.
2 10
Koons entitled his sculpture "String of Puppies.
'21'
Art Rogers learned of the sculpture when it was reviewed in
the Los Angeles Times.1 2 He filed suit in federal district court for
199. 960 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1992).
200. Id. at 304.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Adrian Dannat, Art/The 'Mine' Field, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 23, 1992, Arts sec.
at 20.
204. David Goldberg and Robert Bernstein, 'Puppies'-Parody or Plagiarism?,
N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1992, at 3.
205. Id.
206. Kristine McKenna, 'The Art World is Ripe for Me; Jeff Koons' High Profile
Marketing at Media Manipulation Makes his Talent Seen Secondary, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22,
1989, Calendar at 4.
207. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305.
208. Id.
209. Martin Garbus, Law Courts Make Lousy Art Critics, NEWSDAY, April 22, 1992, at
46.
210. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305.
211. Id.
212. Goldberg, supra note 204, at 3.
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copyright infringement.2"3 Cross motions for summary judgment
were filed, and Rogers' motion on liability was granted. 21 "4 Koons
asserted the fair use defense, claiming that he was parodying not
the original postcard but the sentimental and maudlin elements of
our culture that it symbolized. 15 Although his argument was prob-
ably sincere from an artistic standpoint, the court rejected it en-
tirely, ruled that the sculpture was not fair use and affirmed the
lower court's judgment.1 It identified the elements of the photo-
graph that created a copyrightable work - lighting, pose, angle, se-
lection of film and camera - and held that since Koons copied
these elements, he had substantially copied the work.2" 7 The court
ordered a remand on damages and required Koons to return the
sculpture he had retained for himself.1
1 8
Koons' "Banality" show appropriated other images as well,
with fewer legal repercussions. The cornerstone of his "Banality"
phase work, currently on exhibit at the San Francisco Museum of
Modern -Art, includes a 1988 sculpture entitled "Michael Jackson
and Bubbles." The sculpture, like "Puppies," is done on a semi-
monumental scale and painted with exaggerated, garish colors.
Michael Jackson, with white skin and gold clothes and decoration,
is seated aside his pet chimpanzee. The image was copied directly
from a publicity photograph.21 9 John Caldwell, Curator of Painting
and Sculpture at SFMOMA, reports that no liability resulted be-
cause the photo was uncopyrighted, and according to Koons,
Michael Jackson is pleased with the work.2 In previous works,
Koons has appropriated the Pink Panther and Odie (of the Gar-
field cartoon), and faced lawsuits for each. 21
Martin Garbus, a New York attorney specializing in constitu-
tional law, commented in a 1992 New York Times article that the
decision in Rogers v. Koons may have been unduly influenced by
the fact that the court never viewed the actual sculpture. 22  The
213. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305.
214. Id. at 305-06.
215. Id. at 309.
216. Id. at 313.
217. Id. at 307.
218. Id. at 313.
219. Captions from the "Banality" room at Jeff Koons, exhibit at the San Francisco
Museum of Modern Art, Dec. 10, 1992 through Feb. 7, 1993.
220. Telephone interview with John Caldwell, Curator of Painting and Sculpture, San
Francisco Museum of Modern Art, Dec. 12, 1992.
221. It's Art, but is it Theft as Well?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1991, at D7.
222. Martin Garbus, Law Courts Make Lousy Art Critics, NEWSDAY, Apr. 22, 1992, at
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decision was written on the basis of Rogers' photograph and a pho-
tograph of Koons' work. ' Both were black and white, and both
were the size of a postcard.224 Garbus felt that the photograph did
not adequately bring out the differences in Koons' work - the
unique coloring, huge size and obvious satirical intent.22 5 Curator
John Caldwell agrees that it is not possible to judge artwork like
Koons' from a small photograph. 28 He comments that many visi-
tors to the current exhibit of Koons' work, after reading about or
seeing photographs of the artwork, are surprised with what they
see - and surprised at how much they enjoy it.227 Caldwell calls
the decision in Rogers v. Koons "outrageous. 2 2 8 He comments that
Rogers, who has possession of Koons' sculpture, does not deserve
it. "It's not his work," he explains.2 9
Two other famous appropriation cases have settled out of
court. Robert Rauschenberg created a print entitled "Pull," which
incorporated a photograph by Morton Beebe entitled "Diver."
Since both parties were fine artists with established reputations,
the tension between the two copyright goals manifested itself in
their colloquy. Beebe wrote to Rauschenberg, "You having been in
the lead in protecting artists' rights, I was stunned to see one of
my images so obviously borrowed without recognition. '23 0 Raus-
chenberg replied, "I have received many letters from people ex-
pressing their happiness and pride in seeing their images incorpo-
rated and transformed in my work."'2' 1 A similar dispute took place
in 1965 over the Andy Warhol series "Flowers," which was based
on a photograph by Patricia Caulfield. Warhol was estimated to
have painted over nine hundred "Flowers. 2 32 The settlement in
each of these cases included copies of the offending print. Raus-
chenberg also settled with a cash payment and Warhol promised
Caulfield a royalty on future sales of "Flowers.
'23




226. Telephone interview with John Caldwell, Curator of Painting and Sculpture, San
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employed variations on the work of modern masters. His 1963
"Femme d'Alger" portrays a cartoon-cubist woman, after Picasso's
1907 cubist masterpiece "Les Demoiselles d'Avignon. '2 34 Lichten-
stein added his own commentary to Picasso's work by re-styling it.
An ArtForum critic comments, "While Picasso's originals suggest
an ambivalent attitude to woman, presenting her as at once deliri-
ously sensual flesh and comically monstrous and characterless,
Lichtenstein's negation of her is more thoroughgoing. She has been
completely dephysicalized by being resolutely flattened, and her
monstrousness has been made self-caricaturing .... I'M
Lichtenstein's work demonstrates the importance of copyright
duration and its effect on the legality of derivative works. In this
particular case, Lichtenstein's piece is such a complete transforma-
tion that it may not even be considered derivative. However, Pi-
casso lived until 1973,236 admittedly a long life for a modern
master. For works created in 1963, the 1909 Act was still in effect,
and only provided a duration of twenty-eight years, thus Picasso's
work was in the public domain. In contrast, under the terms of the
Berne Convention, the copyright would not expire until 1957, with
no change in result. But under the terms of 1976 Act, the copyright
would not have expired until 2023, and Lichtenstein might have
been subject to liability.
Finally, no description of appropriation would be complete
without a passing mention to Marcel Duchamp's 1919 work
"L.H.O.O.Q." - his mustachioed Mona Lisa. If Da Vinci held a
copyright in 1919, it would be certain that this work never could
have survived its legal exposure. On the other hand, what was im-
portant about Duchamp's statement was that he had graffitied one
of the icons of western culture, and it is unlikely that any underly-
ing work would command such reverence any less than fifty years
after its author's death.
B. Simulationists
Simulationism is the practice of copying the exact work of preced-
ing artists. In theory it is a "kind of Dada gesture directed against
the myth of artistic originality. 2 37 One of the first simulationists
was Elaine Sturtevant, who, as early as the late 1960's and early
234. Donald Kuspit, Roy Lichtenstein, ARTFORUM, May 1988, at 141.
235. Id. at 142.
236. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 468.
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1970's, produced exact replicas of Warhol's work.2 38 Claes Olden-
berg applauded her efforts - until she started reproducing his work
as well.239
The best known Simulationist in the contemporary crop of
post-Modern artists is Sherrie Levine. In 1981 Levine began
photographing Edward Weston's and Walker Evans' photographs,
reproducing them as exactly as possible.24 ° Sherrie Levine's work
raises serious issues about ownership and authorship.241 Levine ran
afoul of the copyright laws, and stopped appropriating Weston's
work under pressure from his estate.242
Levine's appropriation brings into relief the issue of the im-
portance of printing techniques to photographers. One of Weston's
sons, a photographer himseff, was so protective of his negatives
that he burned them rather than let anyone else make prints from
them.243 Another son, who inherited his father's negatives, was the
only person to print them, pursuant to his father's directions, for
more than 30 years.244 In contrast, some post-Modernist photogra-
phers and photograph-appropriators intentionally send their work
to labs for printing, to de-emphasize the importance of craft in
their work.245
One critic suggests that Simulationism is the ultimate embodi-
ment of self-referent art. Critic Marc Owens comments about
Sherrie Levine that "In all her work Levine has assumed the func-
tions of the dealer, the curator, the critic - everything but the crea-
tive artist."24 Similarly, artists like Koons who neither paint nor
sculpt take on the role of curator to their artisans. Simulationism
may still be active. One contemporary Cuban artist, Consuelo Cas-
taneda, treads the line between Simulationism and Conceptualism
by combining blown-up details of old masters with words and slo-
gans.24 1 It is a premise of post-Modernism that the role of the art-
238. Kevin Thomas and Suzanne Muchnic, The Art Galleries: La Cienega Area, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1987, Calendar at 24.
239. Adrian Dannat, Art/The 'Mine' Field, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 23, 1992, Arts sec.
at 20.
240. Gerald Mazorati, Art in the (Re)making, ARTNEWS, May 1986, at 92.
241. Carl Jerome, Non-Traditional Photography, UPI, May 12, 1989, BC Cycle, at 1.
242. Elizabeth Wang, (Re)Productive Rights: Copyright and the Postmodern Artist,
14 COLUMaIA-VLA J. L. & ARTS 261, 262 n.11 (1990).
243. Charles Hagen, Critic's Notebook: How Sacred Should Photo Negatives Be?,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at C13.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Gerald Mazorati, Art in the (Re)making, ARTNEws, May 1986, at 97.
247. Peter Plagens, Peter Katel and Tim Padgett, The Next Wave From Havana,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 30, 1992, at 77-78.
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ist himself has changed from artisan - a romantic notion, to celeb-
rity - a media-culture phenomenon."4 8
There are no copyright infringement cases reported based on
Simulationist works. This is probably because, as in the Levine/
Weston case, liability is so clear that the case is settled when the
artist ceases appropriating the work. In cases of Simulationism,
copying constitutes one hundred percent of both the underlying
and derivative work. Given this extreme application of factors one
and two, a court would be unlikely to apply the fair use doctrine to
Simulationist work.
C. Conceptualists
The quintessential example of Conceptualism is perhaps Robert
Rauschenberg's telegram, which read, "This is a portrait of Iris
Clert if I say so."2 '9 Conceptualism is appropriation by designation.
The pioneer of conceptualism was Marcel Duchamp, who in the
second decade of this century began making his "readymades" -
ordinary objects isolated and thus transformed into works of art. 5 °
He was perhaps most famous for his 1917 work "Fountain," a uri-
nal set on its back - the most banal of objects transformed into art
by the conception of the artist.251
Barbara Kruger, probably the most renown female post-Mod-
ernist, bridges the gap between Appropriationism and Conceptual-
ism in her work. Described as a "photographer-poet," her earlier
work appropriated photographs in montage with advertising slo-
gans of political relevance. 52 She is best known, however, for her
billboard-like slogan murals, such as "Untitled (Questions)" which
was painted on the outside of the Temporary Contemporary in Los
Angeles between 1990 and 1992.253 The mural was an American
flag the size of a football field with a series of questions embla-
zoned across it:
Who is beyond the law?
Who is free to choose?
Who salutes longest?
Who prays loudest? 54
248. Id. at 99.
249. Hughes, supra note 132, at 334.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 66.
252. Alice Kahn, Too Scared to Go Home, S. F. Chron., July 8, 1992, at D3.
253. Shauna Snow, Paint Rollers Get the Last Word in 'Questions', L.A. TIMES, July
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Kruger escapes liability because her work appropriates layouts
and typographic material, which are not copyrightable. 255 However,
the disadvantage to this safe posture is that her work treads so
close to the edge of copyrightability that it would be difficult to
enforce her copyright against any infringer. When The New Re-
public appropriated Barbara Kruger's slogan style for one of its
magazine covers, Kruger responded, "What are you going to do?
I don't have a copyright on Futura Bold Italic."25
Another interesting example of a contemporary conceptualist
is James Stephen George, also known simply as "Boggs." Boggs
travels around the world drawing that country's currency and at-
tempting to barter his art for its face value in goods or services.25,
Boggs keeps a log of every exchange, and explains that it is the
exchange and not the drawing that constitutes his art. Boggs has
had legal problems with a particular sort of "copyright infringe-
ment": in Britain, he was tried for counterfeiting. However, the
jury acquitted him after deliberating for ten minutes.25
Conceptualists do not always appropriate, and when they do,
they generally do not copy items, but reuse them. Those who, like
Duchamp, use commercial items in their work, benefit from copy-
right law's exclusion of utilitarian articles from copyrightability.
However, by using objects in concert with others or by incorporat-
ing them into artwork, conceptualists may be creating derivative
works or compilations that can be construed as copyright
infringements.
IV. RECONCILING LAW AND ART: SHOULD THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
BE EXPANDED TO ACCOMMODATE APPROPRIATIONISM?
A. The Law Should not Evaluate post-Modernism
As a foundation, it is important to appreciate the wisdom of Jus-
tice Holmes' directive against judicial art criticism. In Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., the Supreme Court rejected a claim
that a circus poster was not eligible for copyright protection be-
cause it did not rise to the level of "fine art. '259 Writing for the
majority, Justice Holmes reasoned:
255. The Copyright Office will not register, for instance, "common geometrical figures
or shapes." COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §53.02(a) and (b) (1984).
256. Charles Hagen, Barbara Kruger: Cover Girl, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, at B25.
257. Paul Dean, A Tough Way to Make a Buck on Rodeo Drive, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1987, at E2.
258. Id.
259. See 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts be-
cause their pictorial quality attracts the crowd and therefore
gives them a real use - if use means to increase trade and to help
to make money . . . . It would be a dangerous undertaking for
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the nar-
rowest and most obvious limits.60
It seems axiomatic that if we are to expand a legal doctrine for the
sake of an art movement, we are making an affirmative policy deci-
sion, and placing the imprimatur of the law upon that movement.
This is both futile and inappropriate. Artists may not desire the
legitimating stamp of the law, no matter how much we may wish to
accommodate them.
Moreover, trends in art are too ephemeral for the pace of the
law. The value of appropriation is being already questioned by the
art world that created it. As early as 1987, the practice was begin-
ning to lose its charm. "Oh no, not another appropriationist, simu-
lationist image-stealer," lamented one art critic, calling the Ap-
propriationists the "rerun tribe." '261  Robert Hughes calls
Appropriationism a "dead end. 262 An art critic for the New York
Times comments, "Post-Modernism has already made its
points.
'26 3
The trend in Europe is away from post-Modernism.2 64 Many
of the stars of post-Modernism have moved on to other things. Jas-
per Johns is returning to a more abstract style.26 5 Barbara Kruger
has stopped focusing on appropriative photography and begun do-
ing magazine covers for Esquire and Newsweek. 6 Jeff Koons has
moved on from his "Banality" phase into his "Made in Heaven"
series, which feature images of him and his wife (Ilona Staller, a
former Italian 'adult film' star and parliamentarian) in explicit sex-
ual poses.
John Caldwell of SFMOMA acknowledges that the appropria-
tion trend is "no longer at its height."2 7 However, he expects that
260. Id.
261. Kevin Thomas and Suzanne Muchnic, The Art Galleries: La Cienega Area, L. A.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1987, Calendar sec. at 24.
262. Robert Hughes, Mucking with Media; The Whitney Offers a Long Trek Through
the Alien Goo, TIME, Dec. 25, 1989, at 93.
263. Andy Grundberg, As It Must To All, Death Comes To Post-Modernism, N.Y.
TIMES, September 16, 1990, § 2, at 47.
264. See id.
265. Jill Johnston, Trafficking With X, ART IN AMERICA, Mar. 1991, at 103.
266. Charles Hagen, Barbara Kruger: Cover Girl, N. Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, at B25.
267. Telephone interview with John Caldwell, Curator of Painting and Sculpture, San
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Appropriationism will continue to be a force in modern art. "It is
hard to see that what Picasso and Duchamp started will come to
an abrupt end."' s6 1 Moreover, he acknowledges that the pieces cre-
ated in the early 1980's will continue to be shown for many years
to come, as museum curators re-assess the merit of existing artists
and continue to unearth their works.269
Post-Modernism seems to have given way to the next "ism" -
Multi-culturalism. Amei Wallach writes, "This year, outsiders are
in. That means African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Chinese-
Americans, Native-Americans . . . and anyone else in non-white,
non-middle-class, non-male America. ' 270 After all, the dominant
culture portrayed in the media was the white, middle class. If that
culture existed at all, it is now a thing of the past. It is fitting that
in the age of multi-culturalism the profession of parodying media
culture is losing its head of steam.
B. The First Amendment Exception Should not be Enlarged
to Accommodate the Failure of Fair Use
In her 1984 article, Patricia Krieg argues that the First Amend-
ment exception to copyright should be expanded beyond the fair
use defense,27' and concludes that appropriation should be allowed
under a version of the functional test. "Appropriation for the pur-
pose of commentary generally does not result in a product which
serves the same function as the original copyrighted material."
's
17
This is certainly true of the Appropriationist techniques of Pop
Art. However, Simulationists necessarily create a derivative work
that could substitute for the original. If Appropriationism is an im-
portant enough form of speech to warrant a First Amendment de-
fense, then Simulationism should be just as important, but the
functional test would not protect it.
Krieg's argument that art can serve the same purposes as
speech is suspect. She illustrates her argument with some of the
few overtly political appropriationist works, and in the process
only proves the premise she is trying to refute - that political im-
agery in art, like news value in photographs, is a limited phenome-
Francisco Museum of Modern Art, Dec. 12, 1992.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Amei Wallach, Lorna Simpson: Right Time, Right Place, NEWSDAY, Sept. 19,
1990, Part II, at 8.
271. Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L. J. 1565,
1578 (1984).
272. Id. at 1584.
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non for which only a narrow exception could be made.273 In fact,
Pop Art is for the most part "totally apolitical, "274 "a celebration
of post-war materialism.""27 It was "never a movement . . . [and]
had no single, coherent manifesto. 2 7' Artists, moreover, might not
wish to balance their artistic freedom upon a platform of political
purpose, since this in itself would be a restriction of content. Such
a limited definition of First Amendment protection is reminiscent
of the totalitarian Soviet philosophy, condemning art for art's sake.
There is an undercurrent to Krieg's argument, also implicit in
Rogers v. Koons, which is important to ferret out. The subtext to
Koons' argument was that fine artists should be able to appropri-
ate the images created by 'banal' artists. Koons' appropriationist
work was "intended to win wry smiles of cultural superiority from
their knowingly smart collectors. 277 Perhaps in response, the court
made much of the fact that Rogers was a legitimate photogra-
pher.2 78 The court was right in avoiding the temptation to accept
this argument. According to both Koons and Krieg, it is more ac-
ceptable to appropriate a commercial image than to appropriate an
image from fine art, even though both are copyrighted, both are
created for profit and, given the necessity of many fine artists to
work in commercial art a "day job," both may be created by the
same person.2 79 Not only does this argument run counter to Justice
Holmes' admonition against courts going into the business of art
criticism, it violates an important tenet of post-Modernism - that
art should not require mastery, only the desire to express.
C. Damages Should Function as a Compulsory License
The issue of fair use and post-Modern art can be condensed
into the following question: Was the decision in Rogers v. Koons
273. Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970).
274. David Lister, Post-War Image of Fun and Rebellion, THE INDEPENDENT, May 9,
1991, at 5.
275. Id.
276. Andrew Graham-Dixon, A Bang! Not a Whimper; What was Pop?, THE INDEPEN-
DENT, Sept. 17, 1991, at 12.
277. Adrian Dannat, Art/The 'Mine' Field, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 23, 1992, Arts sec.
at 20.
278. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1992).
279. Andy Warhol worked as a commercial artist; James Rosenquist worked as a bill-
board painter. Both men's "day jobs" had a stylistic effect on their later work. Hughes,
supra note 127, at 348-53. Richard Prince worked in the tearsheet department of Time, Inc.,
and there developed his use of advertising in artwork. Paul Taylor, Richard Prince, Art's
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correct? In Rogers v. Koons, the court granted not only damages
but an injunction, and ordered that Koons return the unsold cop-
ies of the statue to Rogers.28 Thus, not only was Koons' artistic
expression held liable, it was effectively silenced. Therein lies the
real danger. John Caldwell, the curator of Koons' most recent ex-
hibit, expressed indignity at the outcome of the case - not at
Koons' pecuniary liability, but at the fact that the statue was made
unavailable for exhibit to any museum working with Koons to cre-
ate a representative show.
2 81
Section 504 of the Copyright Act sets forth the remedies avail-
able for copyright infringement, which include statutory damages,
injunction, 282 and in cases of bad faith, attorneys' fees. 8 3 Statu-
tory damages are provided because it is widely considered difficult
to prove actual damages in cases of copyright infringement.2" 4
However, this homily is applicable only to assessment of the au-
thor's reputation, not to the calculation of royalties or proceeds
from the infringing work. In cases of copyright infringement, irrep-
arable injury is presumed, and this results in a judicial practice of
granting injunctions against almost any failed fair use defense.28 5
This is what makes the art community believe the Rogers v.
Koons decision is unfair - not its assessment of liability, but its
application of injunctive relief. The artists who are most likely to
be served with copyright infringement suits are those with a high
profile, and thus a deep pocket. Assessing damages against them
may strike some as unfair, but not as unfair as entirely preventing
the art community from using appropriative techniques.
Title 17 specifies that damages may be assessed in proportion
to the "elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
copyrighted work."2 In so stating, the Copyright Act is recogniz-
ing the important element of unjust enrichment in appropriative
practice and directing that the author of the infringing work pay to
the original author any royalties that result from his use of the
underlying work. If the proceeds from the infringing use, and not
280. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 313.
281. Telephone interview with John Caldwell, Curator of Painting and Sculpture, San
Francisco Museum of Modern Art, Dec. 12, 1992.
282. 17 U.S.C. §504(a) and (b) (19"93). In addition, if the infringement is committed
willfully, the court may assess a fine of up to an additional $100,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)
(1993).
283. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 11, at 205 n.1.
284. Michael J. Pollack, Suing the Stars - 80's Style: The Copyright Infringement
Lawsuit, Ent. L. Rep., Feb. 1986, at Business Affairs sec.
285. ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 278 n. 105 (6th ed. 1986).
286. 17 U.S.C. §504 (1993).
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harm to the original author's reputation, are the basis for damages,
then the infringement action effectively enforces a retroactive com-
pulsory license for the underlying work. Except in extreme cases
where the author's reputation suffers substantial and irreversible
injury, the relief available in cases of appropriation should be lim-
ited to such damages.
The Copyright Act contains explicit provisions for compulsory
licenses in only one other area - "mechanical royalties" for music
publishing. Mechanical royalties are licensing fees imposed on the
mechanical reproduction of sound recordings.8 7 Section 115 of the
Copyright Act provides that after a composition has been initially
published, any person may re-record it and exploit his new record-
ing by performing or distributing it, provided he obtains a compul-
sory license. 28 The Section sets a uniform rate of four and one half
cents per composition, per copy sold, for the mechanical license
fee.28 9 In the record industry, it is common for songwriters and re-
cording artists to negotiate lower licensing fees, but they are al-
ways tied to the statutory rate.2 90 In addition, settlements and
damage awards in song copyright infringement cases are generally
based on a pro-rated share of mechanical and other royalties that
are attributable to the underlying composition. 2 1 The compulsory
license scheme was formulated to allay the music industry's fear of
"monopolistic control of music for recording purposes. '29 2 If the
goal in resolving the problems of fair use in fine art is to insure
that artists may use existing works in their new creations, then
some form of compulsory licensing scheme is an obvious proposi-
tion. However, there are too many fundamental differences be-
tween the song and art markets for a statutory scheme to work.
In the popular song market, compositions are in a sense fungi-
ble - most are of a short duration, are recorded separately, and are
compiled together in albums.29 3 Since they are easily interchangea-
ble, it makes sense to set a statutory rate that is identical for each
287. 17 U.S.C. §115(a)(1) (1993). Even though sound recordings are now generally re-
produced by magnetic or digital means, rather than mechanical means, the term "mechani-
cal royalties" has not changed. The Four Multimedia Gospels, BYTE, February 1990, at 210.
288. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (1993). The license must serve a "notice of intention"
within thirty days after making the reproduction. 17 U.S.C. § 115(b) (1993).
289. SIDNEY SHEMEL & M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 19 (5th ed.
1985).
290. Id.
291. Michael J. Pollack, Suing the Stars - 80's Style: The Copyright Infringement
Lawsuit, ENT. L. REP., Feb. 1986, at Business Affairs sec.
292. ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 206 (6th ed. 1986).
293. Id. at 14.
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composition. Sound recordings tend to appropriate sounds from
other, similar recordings. The price of a recording to the consumer
does not depend at all on the reputation of the songwriter, or even
the recording artist.294 The product is in clear competition with the
record in the next bin, which would be considered an economic
substitute. In contrast, works of fine art are difficult to value and
compare. The price of a piece of artwork to the art consumer de-
pends largely on the reputation of the artist, and there may be no
economic substitutes for a given work. It would be even more diffi-
cult to compare a work of art with the underlying material whose
images it appropriates - material that may range from Brillo boxes,
to publicity photos, to inflatable toys. Such material may enjoy
copyright protection that is entirely different in scope and nature
from that afforded the work of art.
Moreover, in the market for musical compositions, as in the
related intellectual property markets of film, television and literary
properties, 95 most royalties are payable based on the number of
copies sold.296 To the songwriter or record company that markets
the song, the goal is to sell as many recordings as possible, not to
limit the edition. Artworks, in contrast, are usually created in sin-
gle or limited editions, and much of their value springs from that
limitation.297 For instance, a contemporary "work of visual art" is
defined by federal statute as less than 200 copies. 298 Works of fine
art do not normally bear any royalties upon resale.299
These differences compel the conclusion that although a com-
pulsory licensing scheme would address the needs of appropriative
art, a statutory system such as the one in place for recorded music
could not be implemented. Copyright infringement suits therefore
must take on this role, in effect creating a compulsory license
where the artist cannot attain it privately. The availability of in-
junctive relief should not be presumed, statutory damages should
not be available, and damages should be formulated not to assess
the damage to the underlying artist's reputation, but to redirect
the proceeds from the appropriation of his work. A requirement of
294. Record companies typically set consumer prices based on top line and budget line
goods only. Although the royalty rate may vary, the retail price does not. Id. at 4.
295. RICHARD WINCOR, LITERARY PROPERTY 22-23, 99 (1967).
296. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 289 at 4 (5th ed. 1985).
297. See Charles Hagen, Critic's Notebook: How Sacred Should Photo Negatives Be?,
N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at C13; MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 525-551.
298. 17 U.S.C. §101, Sec. 6.01, Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. California's fine arts
law has similar provisions. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(b)(2) (1993).
299. The exception to this is the California Resale Proceeds Act, which assesses a 5%
royalty on public sales of fine art. CAL. CIv. CODE § 986(a) (1993).
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good'faith effort to negotiate a private license would be a reasona-
ble pre-requisite for limiting damages in this way to insure that
the mechanism was not abused.
Of course, every regulation has a price. Any scheme that pur-
ports to insure the availability of copyrighted works must limit the
scope of the copyright."' 0 The statutory compulsory license for mu-
sic restricts the copyright owner in two ways: it takes away his
right to decide whether to license the work, and it sets a price
which he must accept for its use. A parallel compulsory license,
enforced through application of the fair use doctrine, would also
have the effect of removing the author's decision whether to license
the work. In this sense, art would truly belong to the world. It
would also remove his ability to set his own price for what he be-
lieves the possible dilution of his property is worth, insofar as the
appropriator could force him to accept only the proceeds of the
derivative work. The issue is whether this price is acceptable in
order to make images available for appropriative use.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have had understandable difficulty applying the fair use
doctrine to works that embody the "ineluctable modality of the
visible." Application has been particularly inadequate with respect
to post-Modern art, whose appropriative techniques stretch the
doctrine beyond its scope. However, re-formulation of the doctrine,
through the creation of a First Amendment defense or a general
widening of fair use itself, is an inappropriate response. The courts
should maintain a narrow definition of fair use, for which no dam-
ages would be due, and accommodate appropriationists by chang-
ing not the calculus of liability, but the availability of remedies.
Damages in copyright infringement actions involving appropriation
should be limited to a pro-rated percentage of profits gained by the
infringing work. The availability of injunctive relief should not be
available by presumption, because of its silencing effect on
expression.
With this limitation, artists would be free to appropriate what
they wished, but would remain liable to the authors of appropri-
ated works for a portion of the profits from the derivative works.
300. For instance, the device of public domain removes all copyright protection from
older works. See generally Litman, supra note 7.
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Thus, appropriationist expression would not be chilled, but the au-
thors of underlying works would be compensated.
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